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New Jewish Politics for an American Labor Leader: 
Sidney Hillman, 1942-1946 
G E R D K O R M A N 
In 1984, when Canadian-born May Bere Maron recalled Sidney Hill-
man from the days of World War II, she referred to him as one of the 
"Promised Land People." She was then eighty-nine years old, long re-
tired from the Socialist world of Zionist politics of Palestine in which 
she and her Polish-born husband, Israel Mereminski, had engaged for 
so many years. Between 1939 and 1945 he was the American Repre-
sentative of the Histadrut, with an office in Manhattan, and its con-
stant link to Hillman and other American Jewish labor leaders.1 Her 
expression purposefully invoked Promised Land, the title and theme of 
Mary Antin's remarkable autobiography from 1912. in which she por-
trayed her young Russian Jewish embrace of Boston's public Christian 
culture. For May Bere, the book epitomized the kind of national com-
mitment which she thought monopolized the patriotic devotions of most 
Jews in the United States and in Western Europe: They had all been 
reared to unchanging forms of aggressive German, French, English, or 
American national patriotisms. These excluded their own Jewish cul-
tures from "official" national culture and discourse—public school 
curricula and calendars did not acknowledge their presence and ignored 
their past.2 
This simplistic perception of Hillman, the assimilated American im-
1, Dr. May Bere Maron (Mereminski), interview by author, 26 January 1984, Tel Aviv, 
Israel. Mereminski's Papers; including a looseleaf diary for 1940-1945, in the El Al 
Archives, in Israel, are full of entries reporting on conversations and recording messages 
to and from his many contacts, including American labor leaders. Hereafter this collec-
tion is cited as Mereminski Papers. See also A. Manor, Commitment: Israel Meremin-
ski-Maron (Tel-Aviv, 1978). 
2. The Promised Land (Boston, 1912); Moses Rischin, Promised City: New York's 
Jews, 1870-1914 (Cambridge, 1962); Arthur Goren, The Kehillah: Experiment and the 
Quest for Community, 1908-1922 (New York, 1970); Jacob Katz, Out of the Ghetto: 
The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation, 1770-1870 (New York, 1978), pp. 
190-219; Michael Marrus, The Politics of Assimilation: A Study of the Trench Com-
munity at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair (New York, 1971); Fritz Stern, Dream and Delu-
sions (New York, 1987), pp. 6-12, 97-114; George L. Mosse, Masses and Man: Na-
tionalist and Fascist Perceptions of Reality (New York, 1980), pp. 249-315; Uriel Tal, 
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migrant who had consciously turned away from Jewish national pa-
triotic devotions, foreshadowed the judgments of modern historians. 
Indeed, Stephen Fraser, his latest and finest biographer, invoked the lan-
guage of radical assimilation when he insisted that young Hillman 
"remade himself in the . . . cosmopolitan image of the democratic, de-
racinated citizen." His Lithuanian Yiddish accented English notwith-
standing, "in public Hillman increasingly appeared neither Jewish nor 
socialist, while repudiating neither. Surrounded on all sides by a flood 
tide of nationalist sentiments originating in the Jewish working class 
and middle class alike, sentiments inflamed by the war-time and post 
war crises of East European Jewry, Hillman managed, almost by an act 
of will, to escape its orbit almost entirely into a desacrilized political 
culture that deliberately sought to transcend the boundaries of class, 
ethnicity, and religion."3 
The problem with such assessments is that they are too rigid. Among 
the Mereminskis and their social democratic contemporaries, including 
Hillman, rigidity flowed from expectations about the decay of militant 
nationalism and ethnicity derived from nineteenth-century rational vi-
sions which had energized so many European anticlerical liberals and 
socialists.4 Among historians the sources for that kind of rigidity are 
surely more complicated. John Higham recently has called attention to 
the importance of discrete historical periods in determining the com-
plex ways class and ethnicity shaped changing collective identities in 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century America. I have made a related ar-
gument about the changing nature of mid-twentieth-century American 
nationalism and American Jewish collective identity in particular.5 But 
forty years after Matthew Josephson sensed the change in Hillman un-
der the impact of events in Europe and Palestine, historians, who have 
written about the complex labor leader of the dramatic Zionist times 
in which he lived his last years, are still being too rigid about Hillman's 
3. Steven Fraser, Labor Will Rule: Sidney Hillman and the Rise of American Labor 
(New York, 1991), pp. 18-19, 77~79, 93~94-
4. For a brilliant discussion of this tradition in political terms see Carl Schorske's Fin 
de Siecle Vienna: Politics and Culture (New York, 1980). 
5. John Higham, "From Process to Structure: Formulations of American Immi-
gration History," in American Immigrants and Their Generation: Studies and Com-
mentaries on the Hansen Thesis after Fifty Years eds. Peter Kivisto and Dag Blanck 
(Urbana and Chicago, i988[?], pp. 11-41; Gerd Korman, "Ethnic Democracy and Its 
Ambiguities: The Case of the Needle Trade Unions," American Jewish History 75 
(Spring, 1986): 405-416. 
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Jewish identity; they do not allow for profound change as he responded 
to Jewry's grave crisis in mid-twentieth century.6 
This paper argues that in the Holocaust years the public Hillman, 
the labor leader, trapped in the tribal fires of his own modernity, 
stopped acting as a "deracinated citizen." Between 1941 and 1946, he 
used his prestige and influence to facilitate the Zionist cause, without 
having it interfere with his other efforts on behalf of an anticolonial new 
world order led by an American-Soviet alliance. 
Hillman was like other American Jews, whether or not their loved 
ones died in German-occupied Europe, who had to reevaluate fun-
damental assumptions about the nature of their engagement with na-
tionalist Jewish sentiments and politics. In the very moment when 
Allied permanent victories west of Cairo assured Palestine Jewry's se-
curity, Jews began to digest the awful truth of the war: Hitler's state 
terror against the Jews of Germany had turned into acts of mass de-
struction of Jews in European lands occupied by the German army. As 
those acts had the acquiescence or active support of most of the citi-
zens Germans had occupied, Jews in Europe also began to transform 
their Jewish patriotism toward the European nations of those citizens. 
Between 1939 and 1943 all secular non-Zionist and anti-Zionist ap-
proaches to public Jewish identities crumbled, and in the next few years, 
6. No doubt, among the reasons for that failure is the fact that Hillman died in 1946, 
and that most of the evidence for Hillman's change is not in American archives or col-
lections; at least I have not found any in the archives of the ILGWTJ and the ACWA— 
respectively, these include the papers of David Dubinsky and Charles Zimmerman, and 
besides those of Sidney Hillman, the papers of John Abt, Bessie Hillman, Frank Rosen-
blum, and Joseph Schlossberg—in the Zaritzky Papers, Tamiment Library, N.Y.U. (here-
after Zaritsky Papers), or in some of the other collections cited in this paper. Joseph 
Schlossberg's Journals happen to be in the Lessin Archive in Tel Aviv because Schloss-
berg wanted them housed in Israel (hereafter these journals are cited as Schlossberg Jour-
nals); of course he kept the Journal in the United States. The rest of his papers are in the 
ACWA Archives. For Matthew Josephson's remarks see his Sidney Hillman: Stateman of 
American Labor (New York, 1952), pp. 641-2, 657. Samuel Halperin, a political scien-
tist, in The Political World of American Zionism (Detroit, 1961), 157-175 devotes a chap-
ter to "Zionism and Jewish Labor." On Hillman he follows Josephson in ibid., 370, note 
30. Joseph Brandes, "From Sweatshop to Stability," in ed. Ezra Mendelsohn YIVO An-
nual of Social Science, XVI: Essays on the American Jewish Labor Movement (New York, 
1976) pp. 129-131, 148-149 on these points follows Josephson and Melech Epstein, Jew-
ish Labor in U.S.A. J914-1952, 2. vols., (New York, 1953). All these authors base their 
judgments on newspaper accounts, union proceedings, and presumably interviews. The 
following do not discuss American Jewish labor or Hillman in relation to Zionism: Ben 
Halperin, The Idea of the Jewish State (Cambridge, 1961); Melvin Urofsky, We Are One: 
American Jewry and Israel (Garden City, NJ, 1978); Naomi Cohen, American Jews and 
the Zionist Idea (New York, 1975). 
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even though some tried to pursue Bundism and Communism as solutions 
for the Jewish question in Europe, it became obvious that they were be-
yond revitalization. After all, in liberated Poland the anti-Semitic 
pogroms, the murder of Jews, and then the Communist rejection of cul-
tural pluralism demonstrated to all but a few diehards that Communist 
Europe was no place for Jews who rejected Communism. In the awful 
presence of that new knowledge it was also becoming obvious to mil-
lions of Jews that the fate of world Jewry after the war could only be 
assured with the success of the Zionist movement; for without it, Jew-
ry's future could no longer be entrusted to liberal rational politicians of 
Christian societies in the United States and in the lands of its Allies. To 
be sure, Jews in America had accepted, indeed had supported, the pol-
icy of Roosevelt and of other Allied leaders—the war effort cannot be 
deflected from its main goal of defeating Germany—as a justification for 
not developing a special policy to help the Jews of Europe. But during 
1942 and afterward news of the carnage strained that trust in victory 
on those terms. (In time Jews would also have to live with the fact that 
when the doors to Palestine remained closed, Congress joined other post-
war countries in adopting policies that kept most of Europe's Jewish sur-
vivors out of their respective territories.) Under the impact of these events 
a rapidly growing number of Jews in the United States embraced the Jew-
ish Commonwealth in Palestine, not as a land of settlement for them-
selves but so that Jews rejected by the United States would have a 
homeland that welcomed them.7 Within that emerging consensus, Hill-
man became part of a significant group which developed its strategies 
and tactics based on the continuity of wartime alliances in the postwar 
world. Usually participants in antifascist coalitions during the days of 
the Popular Front, they now marshaled their forces for a Jewish Com-
7. Deborah E. Lipstadt, Beyond Belief: The American Press and the Coming of the 
Holocaust 7933-X94J' (New York, 1986); Leonard Dinnerstein, America and the Sur-
vivors of the Holocaust (New York, 1982); Henry L. Feingold, "The Government Re-
sponse," in The Holocaust: Ideology, Bureaucracy and Genocide eds. Henry Friedlan-
der and Sybil Milton (Millwood, New York, 1980), pp. 245-259, and Henry L. Fein-
gold, The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust (New 
Brunswick, 1970); John M. Blum, V Was For Victory: Politics and American Culture Dur-
ing World War II (New York, 1976); David S. Wyman, Abandonment of the Jews: Amer-
ica and the Holocaust 1941-1945 (New York, 1984); Yehuda Bauer, Out of the Ashes 
(New York, 1991), pp. 167, 196. In 1944-45 this change also affected the American Com-
munist Party, even as it was taking its lead from the Soviet Union in supporting a Jew-
ish National Home in Palestine; by 1947 the Jewish Labor Committee, until then still 
reflecting Bundist influences, finally shifted from neutrality to outright support for a Jew-
ish state. Halperin, Political World, 169, 173. 
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monwealth as part of an anticolonial and antiimperialist campaign. Al-
though appealing to some of America's foreign policy ideals, this ap-
proach also coincided with Soviet interests in the Middle East. 
Even as his activities remained embedded in a well-established pub-
lic life, Hillman's response to the Jewish catastrophe was dramatic. For 
years Hillman had retained some links to Jewish public affairs. Besides 
remaining responsive to the sentiments and politics of Jewish members 
through his Executive Board at the Amalgamated, he declared himself 
a Non-Zionist in the 19ZOS, and publicly worked "for the relief of our 
brother Jews in Germany . . . " with Jewish organizations fighting an-
ti-Semitism after Hitler came to power.8 But after Hillman left FDR's 
senior officer corps in Washington and while he was recuperating from 
his heart attack, he turned toward an emerging new Jewish politics. He 
met with Mereminski on several occasions. At one of these meetings, 
Mereminski recalled five years later, "He asked my forgiveness" for not 
giving his full support to the Zionist Histadrut, which he recognized 
as the only remaining Jewish labor movement. "What now" he asked 
and then agreed with Mereminski to establish, with Amalgamated 
funds, an "Amal" vocational school network in Palestine under the aus-
pices of the Histadrut.9 
For Mereminski it was a poignant moment of triumph, for both men 
8. One early and insightful interpretation of his responsiveness is in the writings of 
fellow immigrant and Bundist Selig Perlman, in Selig Perlman and Philip Taft, History 
of Labor in the United States, TS96-1932 New York, 1935), pp. 289-299, 554, 622, in-
cluding footnote 1. See also Perlman's two articles on the subject of Jews and organized 
labor in the United States: "Jewish-American Unionism: Its Birth Pangs and Contribu-
tion to the General American Labor Movement," Publication of the Jewish Historical 
Society 41 (1952): 297-338 and "America and the Jewish Labor Movement: A Case of 
Mutual Illumination," ibid., 44 (1957): 221-232. On Hillman and the American Jew-
ish Congress in 1933 see Fraser, Hillman, 359. See also Jerome I Udell to Hillman, 30 
January 1936, and Hillman to Udell, 4 February 1936, in Hillman Papers, Amalgamat-
ed Archives, Box 75/13. 
9. Manor, Mereminski-Maron, xxi; Mereminski in Histadrut Protocols, 2 July 1947, 
5-6, Lessin Archives, Tel Aviv (hereafter Histadrut Protocols), and Golda Myerson to 
Mereminski, 2 February 1943, in Mereminski Papers. In Box 74 of the Hillman Papers 
there are some letters from Jewish leaders but little more than pro forma responses from 
Hillman. One of the few references in these papers to Mereminski is in brief exchanges 
between Isaac Hamlin, Hillman, or his secretary. In 1952 Hillman's widow, Bessie 
Abramovitz Hillman went to Israel to help dedicate the Hillman Museum of the Amal 
School in Jerusalem. See some notes about this visit in Hillman Papers, 5619/Box 115, 
Folder 10. Mereminski developed a cordial relationship with Dubinsky and there are some 
letters in the ILG collection; the first letter between Mereminski and Dubinsky appears 
to be from 19 April 1942 in /2/254/1B. 
. 
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were then reeling under the impact of tragic family news from Nazi-
occupied Poland and Lithuania and about the general destruction of 
Jewish life in Europe. Hillman, who long before recognized that the 
Jewish Labor Movement had no future in the United States, acknowl-
edged that the Jewish future from labor's European past now rested in 
the hands of the Histadrut. The Amal schools would be the bridge be-
tween the two men and their worlds. Mereminski had chosen "Amal" 
carefully: Amal for Amalgamated and "Amal" for work, in Hebrew, the 
language of Zionist Jews in Palestine. Soon after, within the framework 
of his American devotions and loyalty to FDR, Hillman gave political 
meaning to that Amal bridge. In November 1944, in Chicago, the CIO 
for the first time passed a resolution endorsing the Zionist campaign 
by calling for the "ultimate establishment of a Palestinian Jewish Com-
monwealth in accordance with the principles of democratic action." Ac-
cording the Abraham Miller, Secretary Treasurer of the Amalgamated's 
New York Joint Board and also Treasurer of the American Jewish 
Trade Union Committee for Palestine—he had introduced that resolu-
tion in Chicago—Hillman instructed the Chairman of the Resolutions 
Committee "to clear everything relating to Palestine with Abe. . . . " 
Mereminski was ecstatic. He thanked Hillman profusely for that reso-
lution and for what he considered his general efforts on behalf of 
Palestine's Zionists: "Be blessed you and all your assistants."10 Around 
the same time apparently, Hillman decided to work with the Histadrut 
for a similar resolution in an international forum where the Soviets had 
a mighty voice. 
He was uniquely well positioned for his new role as an advocate for 
a Jewish political campaign in a setting where he had never before 
played it. Since the Bolshevik Revolution Hillman had retained his ba-
sic attitudes toward the Soviet Union and its Communist Party in the 
10. Proceedings of the Amalgamated Clothing "Workers, 1944; Abraham Miller, in Pro-
ceedings of the National Labor Palestine Committee, 1947, 132.; James B. Carey, Secre-
tary-Treasurer, CIO to Harold Laski, Chairman, British Labour Party, 6 August 1945, 
in Zaritsky Papers. Mereminski to Hillman, 26 November 1944, 3 December 1942., and 
14 December 1942 where he records a message to Remez which started with "Happy 
report first time possibility enlisting Hillman cooperation. . . . " Mereminski Papers. On 
December 14, 1948, Schlossberg noted in his Journal that at CIO conventions of earli-
er years Lee Pressman, the "Jewish authority" on the Resolutions Committee censored 
his drafts of "the text for the Jewish resolution." In 1948, "however, with Pressman no 
longer there, I had the gratification of seeing the resolution adopted by the convention 
as I wrote it. I read it in the printed proceedings," On this and related issues see 
Mereminski Papers, 2, 4,12 November T943, Josephson, Hillman, pp. 468-586, and Fras-
er, Hillman, 664, note 16. 
( 
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United States. He had been head of the union that had arranged spe-
cial economic connections with the new Bolshevik regime and had de-
veloped a unique relationship with the Party among clothing industry 
unions. He was the labor leader who, as one of the most powerful fig-
ures in the CIO, was prepared to work with the Party in local New York 
politics in the late-i93os and again in the midst of war. And in 1943, 
in the name of the war effort, he had been singularly silent when Jew-
ish labor leaders expressed their outrage at the Kremlin for having or-
dered, on the grounds of collaboration with the Germans, the execu-
tions of Henryk Ehrlich and Victor Alter, two great leaders of the same 
Jewish social democratic Bund which had earlier nurtured Hillman.11 
Considering the requirements of the Roosevelt Administration vis-a-vis 
Russia as a wartime ally participating in decisions shaping the postwar 
world, Hillman's record would stand him in good stead in negotiation 
with Russian representatives involving the formation of a new inter-
national labor organization, the World Federation of Trade Unions 
(WFTU). 
The WFTU was conceived during World War II in the passion of pre-
war turmoil in labor circles. Anticommunism, in the ranks of most 
American and English trade unionists, collided with the dream, in the 
minds of a minority, including Hillman, to build a future interna-
tional labor organization which would include the unions of the Sovi-
et Union. The roots of these passions were anchored in the international 
traditions and separate organizations of socialists, anarchists, and trade 
unionists in America and Europe, and after the Russian Revolution, 
also of communists active on both sides of the Atlantic. In the inter-
war years, when many more international organizations than ever be-
fore competed for influence and support, the American Federation of 
Labor rejected ideological demands for trade union subordination to 
larger visions of transformation. Between 1921 and 1937 its preoccu-
pation with domestic problems, and its commitment to the principle of 
11. Brandes, "From Sweatshop to Stability," 47-95. On Hillman and New York pol-
itics see Schlossberg Journal, 15 September 1943, 2.8, 29, 30, 31 January, 10 March 1944. 
Hillman's position about the execution of Adler and Ehrlich sounded similar to W. M. 
Citrine's statement as president of the IFTU and in 1943 Chair of the April 1943 meet-
ing of the Emergency International Trade Union Council: "Those who knew Alter and 
Ehrlich cannot believe the accusation and we think that they were executed wrongly. The 
Executive Committee of the IFTU thought t h a t . . . [a] statement had to be made, though 
the words were carefully chosen in order to create the least amount of friction among 
the allied nations engaged in this common war." 19 April 1943, Walter Schevenels Pa-
pers in the Hoover Archives, Stanford University, Box 13 (hereafter Schevenels Papers). 
See also Epstein, Jewish Labor, II, 297-298, and Fraser, Hillman, 517-523. 
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complete autonomy for each free national trade union federation, kept 
the AFL out of the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU), 
an organization it had joined in 1910, seven years after its founding in 
Dublin. When the AFL did rejoin, the constitution of the IFTU made 
it impossible for another organization to represent the United States. 
That meant Hillman and the just emerging Congress for Industrial Or-
ganizations, so resented by AFL leaders, and so engaged with the Stal-
inist politics of the Popular Front, had no access to the IFTU. 
Hillman and other leaders of the CIO found another way to partic-
ipate in an international organization which would include the Soviet 
Union. The first step was taken in London's Transport House, head-
quarters of the British Trades Union Congress (TUC), and by the sum-
mer of 1940, landlord of the IFTU's headquarter staff. A few months 
after Germany's invasion of Russia, the TUC at its annual conference 
in Edinborough called for the creation of a joint War Committee with 
the Soviets, along the lines it had formed with French labor. The new 
Anglo-Russian Trade Union Council was based on the assumption that 
each constituent body would be responsible for its own internal pol-
icy and organization. The TUC's efforts to bring the AFL, the CIO, and 
the independent Railroad Brotherhoods into that Council failed because 
the AFL opposed any type of cooperation with Communist trade unions 
and refused to share representation rights with the CIO or the Broth-
erhoods. But the larger purpose of the TUC did start to take shape by 
the fall of 1943, albeit without the AFL. The CIO outflanked the AFL 
by using the Soviet Union, long opposed to the IFTU, to intensify its 
own pressure on the TUC, the old organizational friend of the AFL. In 
September the TUC, in order to reorganize the IFTU in the spirit of the 
Allied antifascist coalition, set in motion the administrative procedures 
for convening "a World Conference of the representatives of the orga-
nized workers of all countries as soon as war conditions permit. . ."12 
12. John P. Windmuller, American Labor and the International Labor Movement 
1940-1953 (Ithaca, 1954), 1-35; quotation on page 31. See also Lewis L. Lorwin, The 
International Labor Movement: History, Policies, Outlook (New York, 1953), PP-
200-205; Fraser, Hillman, 540-557, 663, note 8; Economist 21 August 1948, crediting 
"largely on British initiative" the first world trade union conference held in London; 
Schevenels to David Dubinsky, 18 August 1941, reflecting cordiality of the relationship 
between Dubinsky and Schevenels, the General Secretary of the International Federation 
of Trade Unions, Report on Activities 1940-1941 of the International Federation of Trade 
Unions in Transport House, London, mirneo copy in Schevenels to W. Green, 14 Janu-
ary 1944 in which Schevenels enthusiastically endorses the TUC initiative for calling for 
a World Trade Union Conference with the Russians. R. L. Nosworthy to Schevenels, 21 
1 
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As he pursued his policy within the sensitive webs of unions in En-
gland and in the United States, Hillman also supported the Histadrut's 
campaign for a national home. During 1944 Hillman had other Zion-
ist choices available to him. In Palestine the Histadrut had badly split 
over the direction of the Zionist movement and this split was re-
flected in discussions over the makeup of the delegation and its in-
structions to the forthcoming World Trade Union Conference, the or-
ganizational meeting preceding the formation of the World Federation 
of Trade Unions. Opponents of Ben Gurion marshaled almost as many 
votes as the majority, and this coalition of minority interests opposed 
identifying the Balfour Declaration phrase "a national home for Jews" 
in Palestine with Ben Gurion's May 1942 call for a Jewish Common-
wealth. Some feared that such a call would lead to partition; others fa-
vored a binational state for Jews and Arabs living between the Mediter-
ranean Sea and the Jordan River. Hillman did not associate himself with 
the position of some in this minority coalition even though those mem-
bers looked to the Soviet Union rather than to Western democracies as 
the primary source of their socialist ideologies. Together with other fu-
ture anti-Cold War warriors, he accepted the majority position which 
by the summer of 1944 meant that the phrases "a national home for 
Jews" and "Jewish national home" had for practical purposes become 
1 synonymous.13 
November 1544, Lord Citrine to H. V. Tawson, 7 February 1950, Boxes 1-3, 12-13, 
Schevenels Papers; Victor Riesel to Dubinsky 3 December 1941, ILG Archives, 259/30. 
13. Elkana Margalit, The Anatomy of the Left: The Left Po'Alei-Zion in Eretz-Israel, 
1919-1946 (Tel-Aviv, 1976), pp. 349-355; Anita Shapira, Berl: The Biography of a So-
cial Zionist (New York, 1984), pp. 331-339; Mereminski to Remez, 14 June 1943, to 
Robert Szold, 18 July 1944, and to Berl Locker, 14 December 1944, Mereminski Papers. 
I. F. Stone's Underground to Palestine and Reflections Thirty Years Later (New York, 
1978), pp. 222, 232-234, 257, provides one American Jewish contemporary and retro-
spective view of this issue in a book originally published by this anti-Cold War journal-
ist in 1946. Nation Associates defrayed $1500 of his expenses. That money came to him 
by way of Meyer Weisgal, a member of the Jewish Agency, and Freda Kirshwey, a friend 
of Weisgal and editor of Nation: Weisgal to Kirshwey, 9 November 1945, and Kirshwey 
to Weisgal, 21 November 1945 in Z5/ i045, Zionist Archives, Jerusalem. Recent biog-
raphers of Stone and Kirshwey have been silent about this link. Robert C. Cottrell, Izzy: 
A Biography of I. E Stone (New Brunswick, 1922), pp. 112-134, 333-335; Sara Alpern, 
Freda Kirschwey: A Woman of The Nation (Harvard, 1987), pp. 128-202. Hillman's sup-
port for Ben Gurion at this time perhaps can be explained by Hillman's fundamental at-
titude toward power, at least as he had expressed it concerning the Bolshevik party in 
the summer of 1921: "If I can find out that it can hold power, I don't care very much 
what you are telling this man about his party. I am not interested in his party. But if it 
can't hold power even if the party is perfect, what use do I have for it." Fraser, Hillman, 
184. 
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The Histadrut approached the Conference from the vantage of the 
only legitimate labor organization in Palestine and as a major public 
Socialist Zionist institution. It had good reason to be suspicious about 
the future policies of the United States and Great Britain toward Jew-
ish survivors and toward the establishment of a Jewish Com-
monwealth. FDR and his party had gone on record favoring a Jewish 
national home, but since the election in November the president ap-
peared reticent to committing himself on the subject. The Histadrut 
also had good reasons for assuming that Russia would remain hostile 
toward Zionism. Under such circumstances of insecurity and fear it was 
of crucial importance for the Histadrut to find as many international 
opportunities as possible for obtaining statements on the public record 
which supported Commonwealth resolutions. The Histadrut wanted 
such support for the right kind of resolution from the World Trade 
Union Conference and if possible to get it without the opposition from 
the Soviet Union. In practice that meant support for the kinds of res-
olutions that had been adopted earlier by the American Federation of 
Labor, the CIO, the British Trades Union Congress, and the Mexican 
Federation of Labor. It was an important moment, for if, in the face of 
ominous signals from the Soviet Union about the Zionist campaign, the 
Conference would in fact adopt a positive resolution about a Jewish 
Commonwealth or national home in Palestine without Soviet opposi-
tion, then there would be reason for optimism about Russia's future in-
tentions about a Jewish state.14 
The Histadrut learned quickly what Mereminski had appreciated all 
along: In the event of a conflict of interests with Hillman it would have 
to find a way to allow Hillman to help within the framework of his 
larger agenda at the conference, namely to "complement" the Allies' 
unity spirit of the Yalta Conference.1-5 Hillman came as Roosevelt's man 
and as the head of the powerful CIO delegation which included James 
14. On 16 January 1945 Nachum Goldman wrote Berl Locker about information 
"from Washington emanating from a very high source" which worried the Jewish Agency 
about Russia's "rather negative" attitude toward a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine. 
See also Goldman's cable of 20 February 1945 to Locker asking if the Soviets voted for 
the "Palestine Resolution" at the W'lTJC, in Goldman Papers, Z5/83 in Zionist Archives, 
Jerusalem (hereafter Goldman Papers). 
15. After his return Hillman told the World Unity Rally in Madison Square Garden, 
"In a very real sense, these two historic conferences complement each other." Mimeo 
Copy of Address in Vol XI of the ACWA Scrapbook, 1945-1946, 45. Mereminski told 
Schlossberg that just before Hillman left for London, Hillman told him "that there were 
bigger things to be done, and that he could not afford to 'bother' with 140,000 people 
(The Histadrut)." Schlossberg Journal, 17 March 1945. 
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Carey, the CIO's Secretary Treasurer, and a Communist contingent.16 
An early problem set the pattern. The British Trade Union Congress had 
given delegate and observer status to an Arab delegation from Pales-
tine which the Histadrut argued did not represent a bona fide expres-
sion of free Arab labor in the Holy Land. To the Histadrut the deci-
sion of the British was especially irksome because from its perspective 
the English government had formed those unions to fight the His-
tadrut and because the Arab unions associated with the Histadrut or 
cooperating with the Histadrut were given only observer status. Tel Aviv 
asked Mereminski to get Hillman's help in appealing the ruling, but 
Hiliman had no intention of being sucked into a controversy. He did 
not object to the Histadrut's argument nor did he underestimate the im-
portance of the representation issue; for he was worried that the Sovi-
ets might use the opportunity for denying the Histadrut's claim as sole 
representative of Palestinian labor. Locker thought there might be a 
chance to move Hiilman if there was "real proof" that the invited Arab 
union from Palestine was not a bona fide free union. And Hiilman did 
inform Mereminski that he wished that he had known about this prob-
lem earlier, when he had attended a preliminary planning meeting for 
the Conference in December 1944, perhaps because then he might 
have prevented CIO support of the TUC's invitation. Now it was too 
late for him to do anything about it.17 
Without losing Hiliman, Mereminski in New York, and Histadrut 
officials in London and Palestine found another way to resolve the rep-
resentation crisis and at the same time to shelter Hiliman and the CIO 
delegation in discussions of the resolution itself. They complained be-
16. Lee Pressman and John Abt, two influential labor lawyers close to Hiilman, in 
the CIO and in the Amalgamated, respectively, and Len Decaux, a labor journalist, then 
the editor of the CIO News, were part of the delegation. De Caux, Labor Radical: From 
the Wobbliesto CIO A Personal History (Boston, 1970), pp. 447-469, 521-545; Bert 
Cochran, Labor and Communism: The Conflict that Shaped American Unions (Prince-
ton, 1977), pp. 232, 233, 95, 100, 120, 145, 303; Harvey Klehr, The Heyday of Amer-
ican Communism: The Depression Decade (New York, 1984), pp. 229, 233, 241, 243, 
413. 
17. Mereminski Papers, 13 January 1945, in which Mereminski reports on a con-
versation with Hillman's secretary who then served as the connection between Meremin-
ski in New York and Hiilman in London. See also Mereminski Papers, 17 January 1945, 
for a copy of a telegram from Berl Locker, the Jewish Agency's man in London, who re-
ported that Hiilman could not raise the representation question because CIO delegates 
had joined in the invitation apparently because the TUC had persuaded them "favorably 
about the Haifa organization"; and 23 January 1945 for copies of telegrams to Tel Aviv 
about other aspects of Hillman's views on the controversy and on his insistence that he 
"regards now his single mission intermediate BTUC USSR delegations. . . ." 
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fore and during the Conference but accepted the decision of the TUC 
on the issue of delegations, which they attributed to British foreign pol-
icy toward Palestine. They also asked leaders in the Mexican delega-
tion to take the point on behalf of the Histadrut's Palestine resolution. 
As staunch supporters of the Soviet Union and well-known fierce crit-
ics of American capitalism in general and of the AFL in particular, their 
trusted Mexican friends would play important parts at the Conference. 
Vincente Lombardo Toledano, and his substitute on that committee, 
Alejandro Carrillo, would with Hillman serve on the important Ad-
ministrative Committee of the World Trade Union Conference.18 
The Palestine Resolution was part of the Conference's "Declaration 
on the Attitude to the Peace Settlement" which was drafted by a com-
mittee chaired by Secretary of the CIO, James Carey, and included Berl 
Locker, who was serving as a delegate from the Histadrut.19 The pres-
ence of these delegates, and, as Hillman told Schlossberg a few months 
later, Hillman's successful effort preventing Citrine and "the other 
leading delegates at the Conference" from getting their way, assured the 
Committee's adoption of Article Twenty-six. This draft was a care-
fully edited version, perhaps written by Mereminski, of a longer state-
ment presented by the Histadrut. Its language, as Locker recognized, 
echoed resolutions adopted earlier by the major American labor fed-
erations, the British Trade Union Congress, and the Mexican Federa-
tion of Labor20: 
18. Aaron Rabinowitz to Mereminski, 9, Z3 January 1945; Mereminski to Rabi-
nowitz, 9, Z3 January 1945, to B. Locker, 9 ,13 January 1945, to Alejandro Carrillo, 13 
January 1945, Mereminski Papers; Schlossberg Journal, 17 March 1945. See also Fra-
ser, Hillman, 664, note 16, Report of the World Trade Union Conference, County Hall, 
London, 6 and 7 February 1945, Reported verbatim by John Mcintosh and S. Ireland, 
Official Reporters to British Trade Union Congress, 147, z$j, for the resolution of this 
issue. 
19. On 27 December 1944 Berl Locker cabled Mereminski from London that Hill-
man had been "very friendly" in talks with Jewish Agency people and "promised full sup-
port at forthcoming Congress . . . " Mereminski Papers. A few months after the meeting 
Carey explained his personal conviction for enthusiastically supporting the CIO's reso-
lution of November 1944 and the Palestine Resolution of the WTUC. Carey to Harold 
Laski, 6 August 1945, Zaritsky Papers. 
zo. Schlossberg Journal, 14 March 1945. Socialist Zionists, and Locker in particu-
lar, had for some years been well connected to the International Federation of Trade 
Unions. That organization kept itself informed about the status of Jews during the war 
and their potential for becoming immigrants after the war. See, for example, correspon-
dence between the Histadrut and the IFTU from 1943 in folder marked "International 
Material" in 2.08/rVi/i, Lessin Archives. Locker became the Histadrut's delegate to the 
ILO's Emergency Council in early 1943, and he, Golda Myerson, and some others from 
/ 
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"This World Conference is of the opinion that after the war, thor-
ough-going remedies must be found through international action, for 
the wrongs inflicted on the Jewish people. Their protection against op-
pression, discrimination and spoliation in any country must be the re-
sponsibility of the new International Authority [that is of the UN]. The 
Jewish people must be enabled to continue the rebuilding of Palestine 
as their National Home, so successfully begun by immigration, agri-
cultural resettlement, and industrial development."21 
If any delegate or observer read UN Mandate into the meaning of 
the resolution because it did not use the expression of "common-
wealth" or "state," Locker, Carrillo, and the Arab delegate, whose sta-
tus the Histadrut had challenged, clarified the language in open gen-
eral meetings of the Conference. After recognizing what "democratic 
states" and the Soviet Union had done for Jews, Locker insisted that 
his people needed their own country to enjoy freedom from fear, one 
of the four freedoms promulgated by the Atlantic Charter. Before the 
war, "we used to say that for the Jew the world consists of two kinds 
of countries, one kind of country which drives us out and the other kind 
of country which does not let us in. During this war the Axis powers 
have killed us but the United Nations have done very little to save us." 
The situation had to change and the answer was obvious: "We have laid 
the foundation of a new home for the Jewish people in the last sixty 
years." 
John Asfour, the Arab delegate, objected to the second part of the 
article so crucial to Locker. "In my submission to you I would say this, 
that the question of the oppression of the Jews in Europe and the 
question of establishing a Zionist State in Palestine are two different 
subjects. . . . " When Carrillo enthusiastically endorsed and amended Ar-
ticle Twenty-six, Asfour again took issue with the second part. 
the Histadrut's Executive Committee remained in regular contact with "Comrade" Wal-
ter Schevenels, General Secretary of the IFTU and later of the World Federation of 
Trade Unions. Max Zaritsky, Chairman of the American Jewish Trade Union Commit-
tee for Palestine also participated in these contacts. Nathan Jackson, Jewish Socialist 
Labour Party, to W. Schevenels, 10 December 1941; Golda Myerson to Schevenels, 16 
October 1942; Schevenels to Executive Committee, General Federation of Jewish Labour. 
On 28 November 1946 when Schevenels forwarded an appeal from the Histadrut for help 
from the British government from some 4000 Jewish refugee, displaced persons facing 
deportation form Haifa to Cyprus, he wrote H. V. Tewson, General Secretary of the TUC, 
that the "General Federation of Labour in Palestine . . . has been for many years and still 
is one of our most faithful trade union movements." 18 November 1946, Box 3, 12 and 
13, Schevenel Papers. 
21. Proceedings of the World Trade Union Conference, 181. 
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Carrillo had in fact taken the point: The Jewish people are a people 
without a state, and we cannot possibly see why the Atlantic Charter 
should make an exception of them. The Atlantic Charter calls for all 
peoples to organize themselves politically as they think fit, and in their 
own interest. Are we not going to let the Jewish people organize them-
selves politically and have their own state? Will they be the only peo-
ple in the world who will not be 'given the opportunity to organize 
themselves politically? But to remove "any doubts about the good 
faith of the Labour Movement of the world" represented by the Con-
ference, and no doubt to assure a broad basis of support, Carrillo re-
sponded to Asfour's argument in a context when Palestinian Arab na-
tionalism, as we know it today, was not a subject of the controversy at 
the Conference: "Our comrades representing the Arab Labour Move-
ment cannot tell us that this is a problem in which we cannot very well 
take a decision. They have several states already organized." If Arabs 
were in the position of Jews, Carrillo promised Asfour, "we from Latin 
America would come here to fight for the political rights and for the 
possibility of Arab States existing in the world." To protect non-Jews 
in Palestine, the Mexican labor leader offered an amendment to Arti-
cle Twenty-six; it expressed the Conference's expectations that the 
Jews' National Home would respect "the legitimate interests of other 
national groups" and would give "equality of rights and opportunities 
to all of its inhabitants." 
Asfour tried to get help for striking that second part of the article 
and for rejecting the amendment. He did gain the voice of a member 
of the Indian delegation who, in the form of a question, presumed to 
know the intention of a future sovereign Jewry in Palestine, which in 
light of events in Europe and Hindu-Moslem conflicts in India was 
fraught with special meaning in February 1945. "If Palestine is to be-
come the National Home of the Jews, what about the other population? 
Are they going to be transplanted or exterminated?" But he and Asfour 
got nowhere. Carey's committee accepted Carrillo's amendment and so 
did the Conference.22 The Histadrut had its resolution with Russia on 
board and without it having become a major obstacle standing in Hill-
man's path for the World Federation of Trade Unions.23 
22. Ibid., 81-83, 182-186, 188-191, 236-239. For a detailed explanation of the me-
chanics by which the resolution was adopted see Locker telegram to Goldman, 25 Febru-
ary 1945, Goldman Papers. The American Socialist Zionist journal Jewish Frontier 
covered the WTUC meetings of 1945, including one account by Ephraim Broido, one of 
Histadrut's consultants attached to the official delegation. Ibid., 23 May 1945. 
23. Locker cabled Goldman: "For internal information Russia representative peace 
( 
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The Histadrut also had its hands full, at least for a moment. Among 
its friends in the trade union movement were friendly critics who had 
opposed the formation of the World Federation of Trade Unions pre-
cisely because it included Communism's captive unions. Decade-old AFL 
opponents of Hillman, the CIO, of Russia and American Communists, 
who had supported the Histadrut long before the CIO, went on record 
demanding explanations about events in London. Dubinsky and Green 
in particular cried foul: Is this the way to treat old friends? Praises for 
Hillman and the CIO and silence for Green? Cooperation with the So-
viets and their Communist stooges in the CIO and in the American del-
egation in London?24 
The Histadrut had an obvious explanation and Dubinsky's response 
to it was itself a commentary of the changes among American Jewish 
labor leaders toward a new Jewish politics. Mereminski came to make 
peace. He told Dubinsky his organization had no choice in London 
where it was obligated to fight for the political agenda of the Jewish 
Agency, the governing body of the Zionist movement. In a forum where 
government policies were being expressed and even represented by 
many a delegation, the Histadrut's primary directive obligated it to get 
the best possible resolution. What else could its delegates do except to 
praise Hillman in public. In other words the Histadrut was "duty" 
bound to do everything possible to gain support for a Jewish Com-
monwealth. In February 1945, more than a year before the Jewish 
Agency could opt for partition, Dubinsky accepted the explanation. He 
understood, and so did Green and other friends in the AFL. In fact in 
the next few years, when tensions between them became exacerbated 
as a result of the Cold War, they and CIO supporters of the Histadrut 
found a way to cooperate with each other on behalf of a Jewish state 
in Palestine.25 
settlements committee actively support Palestine clause." 25 February 1945, Goldman 
Papers. 
24. Box 11 in Schevenals Papers include an entire folder containing nothing but clip-
pings about this controversy between the AFL, CIO, IFTU, and the formation of the 
WFTU. See also Schlossberg Journal, 5 May 1945, and Dubinsky, A Life With Labor, 
245-249. 
25. Mereminski to Bracha Haba, 6 August 1945, to Locker, 6 August 1945, to Gol-
da, 5 August 1945, Green to Mereminski, 2 August 1945, a n d Green's message to Vaad 
Hapoel, 3 August 1945, Mereminski papers. For reports of AFL and CIO leaders shar-
ing Labor Zionist platforms see the publications of the American Trade Union League 
for Palestine and Epstein, Jewish Labor, II, 411-412. However, the basic concern for AFL 
leaders about attitudes toward Russia remained. See for examples Goldman's report of 
a 1949 meeting which included George Meany, Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL: they could 
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Unfortunately, as least as far as I know, we have no documentary ev-
idence for the days of the Conference itself, to demonstrate precisely 
what Hillman did on behalf of the Histadrut. Some of his work had 
been done a few months earlier in connection with the CIO's adoption 
of a Commonwealth resolution. When Hillman came home from Lon-
don, he reported about the Conference to the General Executive Board 
of the Amalgamated where he ma'de it appear, probably correctly, 
thought Schlossberg, as if he, Hillman, "was the most outstanding 
person" in London. Schlossberg, who usually thought that Hillman 
worked hard in order to inflate his reputation, did record what Hill-
man had told him "privately" after the Amalgamated's Executive Board 
meeting on 13 March: "When he approached Citrine and the other lead-
ing delegates at the Conference about the Jewish situation in Palestine 
he was told by them 'don't bother with it.' He said further that when 
he spoke to Carey . . . about the CIO resolution on Palestine, Carey told 
him that it was impossible to take it up with the Committee without 
provoking a fight. He said that he told Carey to present it to the Com-
mittee as the position of the CIO and cause no fight. Carey did so and 
the Jewish resolution was adopted by the committee. Hillman also 
said that Berl Locker was put on the Coninuation Committee as rep-
resentative of the entire Middle East. The implication of this statement 
was that Hillman was responsible for it."26 
From the perspective of the Histadrut Hillman did run the whole 
show and therefore made possible the passage of Article Twenty-six. At 
the least he and his delegation had protected the Histadrut and the heart 
of its resolution from potential British and Russian opponents. Surely, 
it is not unimportant to note that when Toledano was in New York in 
May 1946, Nahum Golman, a senior member of the executive com-
mittee of the Jewish Agency, thought he had a promise from Toledano 
to take a secret memo to Moscow; Goldman was trying to establish di-
rect personal contact between the Agency and Molotov or other senior 
officials in Moscow.27 To be sure, within the same year the Soviets 
backed away from their support of 1945, but in 1947, when the Cold 
not understand why Israel refused to choose between freedom and totalitarianism. Gold-
man to Berl Locker, 16 June 1949, Goldman Papers. 
26. Schlossberg Journal, 14 March 1945. 
27. Goldman to Toledano, 21 May 1946, and the memo taken by Toledano to 
Moscow. Goldman Papers. On 3 August, Goldman, who identified himself as being pro-
Russian in the Jewish Agency, opposed a pro-Russian orientation for the Agency. In the 
context of Zionist politics and world power realities it would be "clumsy, naive, and dan-
gerous." Address to Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency in Paris, Ibid. 
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War with its Mideast cockpit was well underway, the Russians changed 
again. By endorsing partition and the establishment of a Jewish state 
in Palestine, they caused painful spasms in Anglo-American entangle-
ments in the Near East and electrified the rest of the United Nations.28 
Then, and during other meetings of the Histadrut's executive commit-
tee in that year, the events of 1945 were reinvoked and Hillman's role 
appreciated with the advantage of hindsight. Now it was obvious; 
starting with those founding meetings, the American delegations had 
been the Histadrut's staunchest supporters. 
These had been Hillman's delegations, even after he died. In 1947, 
Frank Rosenblum, another opponent of the Cold War and senior offi-
cial from the Amalgamated, had taken his place at the head of the 
American delegation, first in Washington in 1946, and then in Prague, 
at the 1947 meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions. The large 
Histadrut delegation still hardly knew him; for all intents and pur-
poses he was an unknown. But Rosenblum soon changed that impres-
sion, here was "Hillman plus." The transcript of one of the Histadrut's 
executive committee meetings, which Frank Rosenblum attended in Tel 
Aviv, continues "And instead of that important man Hillman, who had 
participated in the other two meetings . . . " of the WFTU, there came 
to Prague "another Jew of lesser importance in the CIO than Hillman 
. . . He saw to it as his personal responsibility to conduct himself with 
the will of the man whom he had replaced. From the first moment he 
and the other members of the American delegation took it upon them-
selves to defend our position and to fight aggressively for the strongest 
resolution on our behalf." Indeed, together with Toledano, Rosenblum 
had himself taken the point in Prague.29 
Even when the catastrophes of war and the Holocaust swirled all 
about, Hillman had supported an important Zionist stream in Jewish 
politics at his own pace and on his own terms. He had remained a devo-
28. On 19 August 1546, Mereminski, back in Tel Aviv by then, wrote Dubinsky that 
the anti-Zionist policies of the British Labor government are especially satisfying to "re-
actionary Arabs and reactionary Communists. . . ." in ILG Archives, /2/254/1A. For 
Lockers comments on the changes in Russian policy, see Histadrut Protocols, 2 July 1947. 
29. Mereminski in Histadrut Protocols, 2 July 1947, 5-6; WFTU, Session of the Ex-
ecutive Bureau, 20-24 September 1946, 2, 3, 4, 6, 47, 48, 52, 60 (In these latter pages 
there is ample evidence for strong anti-Cold War position in favor of Soviets, especially 
by Toledano.); Proceedings of the World Federation of Trade Unions, Meeting of the Ex-
ecutive Bureau, 2-5 , 7, 14 June 1947, 76-83. In this instance Rosenblum and Toledano 
had to cope with the Chair, who fought on behalf of the policy of his British government, 
and with the Russian delegate who, for reasons of his own, also strove to weaken the 
resolution. 
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tee of his larger American strategies. These incorporated participation 
in antifascist coalitions, including opposition to the emerging Cold 
War and to British policy in the Mideast, especially in Palestine. But he 
had also participated in public as a supporter of a new Jewish politics. 
One can hear the change in Hillman as he addressed the Amalga-
mated Convention in May 1946: "My friends, there is one group that 
they [the Nazis and fascists] decided to destroy completely, so as not 
even to leave any representatives of this people even to carry water for 
them. They almost succeeded. They destroyed six million Jews. Those 
Jews are gone, but there are others in Germany today . . . [who] are re-
quired to live in camps with all their memories of the horrors of the 
past . . . These people want to get out of Germany and there is only one 
place they want to go to, and that is Palestine, and I say to you that 
no one has the moral right to stop them from going there. . . . We can 
properly demand that the Labor government of Britain act promptly to 
abrogate the infamous White Paper of its Tory predecessor and let down 
the bars of Palestinian immigration to admit at least 100,000 homeless 
Jewish people."30 
And one can hear the change even more loudly in Hillman's Amal-
gamated when it declared in its "Resolution on the Jewish People: Six 
million wracked and tortured Jewish bodies chocked the charnel 
houses and fired crematoriums of Nazi Europe. These six million dead 
are beyond tears. But the survivors of that holocaust of anti-Semitism 
have a special claim on the conscience of democratic mankind . . . Re-
solved: That the 15th Biennial Convention of the Amalgamated Cloth-
ing Workers of America . . . Reaffirms the decision of the 14th Bienni-
al Convention [of 1944] in support of the establishment of Palestine as 
a homeland for the Jewish people."31 
30. Proceedings of the Fifteenth Biennial Convention of the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers of America, 6-10 May 1946, 98; Josephson, Hillman, 612-668; Walter La Feber, 
America, Russia, and the Cold War (New York, 1980), pp. 29-48. For similar statements 
in support of the 100,000, or in support of Hagana resistance efforts against British au-
thorities see New York Sun n April, 3 July 1946, New York Daily News Record, 28 
March 1946 in ACWA Scrapbook, 543, 563. 
31. Proceedings, 193-194. For one helpful elaboration of this position by anti-Cold 
War warriors in the context of the emerging hostility toward Russia in the United States, 
see Stone, Underground to Palestine, 215-224 and Cottrell, lzzy, 114-122. For an il-
lustration of conflicting currents in the ranks of American Jewish labor leaders, in part 
perhaps because of changing events in Poland between 1947 and 1949, see the dramat-
ic exchanges on the floor of the ILGWU as reported in the Proceedings of its 26th Con-
vention, 6-22 June 1947, 478-483. See also Epstein, Jewish Labor, II, 401, 404-405, and 
Bauer, Out of the Ashes, 167-169. 
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Hillman died shortly after that convention, so one cannot know what 
he would have done afterward. But in his last four years he had 
surely acted and was perceived by others as having acted as if the cen-
tral question then facing world Jewry had also become an integral 
part of his public posture as an American labor leader. In that respect 
he had joined a growing number of American Jews who were then in 
the process of refashioning their public Jewish identity. Fifty-nine when 
he died, it is difficult to conceive of him with different attitudes than 
those espoused after 1947-48 by other union comrades: Dubinsky 
who abandoned his Bundist anti-Zionism; Zaritsky, who had long sup-
ported Socialist Zionism, or for that matter Joseph Schlossberg, his old 
Socialist Zionist opponent in the Amalgamated. Together with those 
supporters of Israel who remained critical of anti-Soviet Cold War 
warriors, Hillman in those years would have made permanent the 
change he had started in 1942. (After all, in 1945 the American Com-
munist Party had also endorsed a version of the Commonwealth reso-
lution, and between 1947 and 1951 the same Soviet leadership which 
had supported such a resolution at the World Trade Union Conference 
played a decisive role in assuring Israel's victory in its war of indepen-
dence.) Indeed, from that perspective his work at the World Trade 
Union Conference did more for the establishment of a Jewish state than 
it did on behalf of a new international labor organization.32 In the year 
of Israel's birth, the CIO began to leave the WFTU. 
32. De Caux was convinced that Hillman's efforts for establishing the WFTU "was 
the highpoint" of his "high-soaring career." After the convention was over he and Hill-
man grabbed a bite and the two talked easily, without any agendas. "He's pleased with 
a good job well done. Then I stole a glance at the sharp eyes behind the glasses and above 
the sharp nose. Sidney Hillman was at peace with himself." De Caux, Labor Radical, 
467-469 
